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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HERSCHEL BULLEN, administrator of 
/ the estate of HEBER 0. CRONQUIST, 
deceased, and wife IDELLA N. 
CRONQUIST, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL 
COLLEGE a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
F I L E ll~E.-NELSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
--~----.'- -.-- ····-·---------=-· 
CLEfi~ SUPHEME COUR~UTAH 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HERSCHEL BULLEN, administrator of 
the estate of HEBER 0. CRONQUIST, 
deceased, and wife IDELLA N. 
CRONQUIST, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL 
COLLEGE a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEME.NT OF CASE 
Respondent in its brief, fails· to discuss the pertinent 
facts set forth by appellant to establish a spendthrift 
trust, viz., - the plain and unmistakable language used 
in the will; distributing the trust property to the trustee 
to hold for 20 years, with full and complete control and 
management for that period of time. Appellant points 
out on page 2 of his brief that the court, following the 
terms of the will distributed the greater ~of his estate 
outright. Respondent at page· 1 of its brief says the san1e 
thing by using figures instead of words, and adds, that 
only property subject to a lease was put in trust. This 
indicates that decedent wanted to preserve the leased or 
trust property for the benefit of whosoever of the persons 
named in the will were alive at the end of 20 years. 
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2 
And in page 2 of its brief, respondent states that var-
ious assignments of the rentals were paid by assignment, 
to various persons. Heber Cronquist no doubt needed 
money, had no other way of raising it, and so gave an 
assignment. No doubt his dealings with his assignees 
presented no dispute. It is also submitted that there is a 
vast difference, legally, between assigning the income af-
ter it has accrued, than disposing of the trust estate. . But 
this problem is not inv~lved here, nor . can the mere fact 
that Heber made an assignn1ent of the income and paid 
it, have any bearing on or change the provisions of de-
cedent's will. After all, the interpretation of d~cedent's 
\vill is in issue here. Respondent also points out that 
Heber gave a mortgage to the First Security Bank. But 
it will als<? be seen that this property was included as 
additional security; and moreover, it further appears that 
the bank required all of Heber's heirs to sign the mortgage. 
(See Trans. 085). App:7ntly the bank did not regard 
Heber as having any~ Interest in the property. 
Respondent at page 2 of its brief says appellant re-
tained the $4,QOO.OO, made no protest until his brother 
and sister, some three years later, had sold their share for 
a higher price. This is hardly the fact, and is immaterial 
to . the issues involved in this case. He has consistently 
offered to do equity by accounting for the $4,000.00. When 
the trustee attempted to terminate the trust, Heber ap-
peared by counsel, filed a demurrer, and the decree itself 
distributes the property subject to the rights of Heber 
and the respondent. (See Ex. 2, pages 223, to 240.) A 
dispute had arisen between appellant and respondent, the 
exact time does not appear, reg~rding the validity of the 
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3 
agreen1ent entered into. (See Transcript). Certainly 
appellant could not have acted sooner. The additional 
so called "facts'' respondent refers to, therefore, for the 
n1ost part, adds nothing to the facts given by appellants, 
but rather tends to divert attention from the real issues 
presented by this appeal. The interpretation of dece-
dent's \vill, not Heber's act in assigning the income from 
the trust, is here involved. 
ARGU~~IENT AND AUTHORITES 
I 
Respondent at page 3 of its brief refers to Dean Gris-
wold's work, ''Spendthrift Tn1st," page 38-270 and page 
634, to the effect that the doctrine of spendthrift trust is 
based on public policy, not on sound logic. · The writer 
does not have access to Mr. Griswold's work, but certainly 
neither 54 Am. Jur. 128, or Kelley vs. Kelley, 79 Pac. ( 2d) 
1059, support any such contention. In fact 54 Am. Jur. 
128, Sec. 153, says exactly the contrary. We quote: 
"The validity of a spendthrift trust is grounded 
fundamentally in the principle of cujus est dare, ejus 
est disponere. In other words, the law recognizes a 
public policy allowing a donor to condition his bounty 
as suits himself as long as he violates no law in so 
doing. However, the· law is not in the remotest way, 
in connection with the validity of such a trust, con-
cerned with considerations for the beneficiary. There 
is no sound public policy in denying a settlor such a 
right. Creditors of a beneficiary have no reason to 
complain that a settlor did not give his bounty to 
them." (Italics supplied). 
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And the case of Kelley vs. Kelley, 79 Pac. ( 2d) 1059, 
on page 1063, lays down the following rule citing cases: 
. "It is of the esse!lce of a spendthrift trust that it 
is not subject to voluntary alienation. by the cestui, 
nor subject to involuntary alienation through attach-
ment or other process at the suit of his creditors. # 0 0 
A voluntary assignment executed before payment to 
the beneficiary confers on the assignee no right to 
demand payment or delivery fron1 the trustee as it 
becomes due to the beneficiary." 
Thus it \v~ll be seen that both the text and the Kelley 
case indica~e that the courts lay down its rules and de-
cisions based upon the intent of testators, - as arrived at 
fro1n the language of the will. Certainly this Court is not 
going to decide this case by laying down a rule of public 
policy (legislate)_ which will have the effect of nullifying 
decedent's' right to will his property, when his will as 
made, violates no known rule pertaining to wills as pro-
vided by law. No doubt, decedent's intent will be sought 
after by this court. 
II 
PENNSYLVANIA CASES 
On page 4 of respondent's brief, counsel attempt to 
show that the rule adhered to in the early Pennsylvania 
case of In Re: Stambaugh, .... 135 Pa. 585, has been over-
ruled in later Pennsylvania cases. The cases of Trask vs. 
Shaffer, 14 Alt. ( 2d) 211, and McCurdy vs. Bellefont 
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Trust Co., 292 Pa. -!07. are cited, but a careful examination 
of the facts in both of these cases distinguish the1n from 
the facts in the instant case. For instance, in Trask vs. 
Shaffer, supra, the '"ill placed the textatrix's property in 
tn1st for and during the life of her 7 children, giving the 
earned income from each share and $200.00 from the prin-
cipal to each child if necessary in the judgment of the 
tn1stee. Thus, the tn1stee had discretionary powers not 
given to the tn1stee named in the Cronquist will. In Mc-
Curdy vs. Bellefont, supra, the testatrix created a trust for 
the life of her three children, and upon their death to 
certain named grandchildren. The Will also provided 
that the trustee could sell the real estate with the ap-
proval of George Bush, one of the beneficiaries. Thus the 
trustee as ·well as the beneficiary, could exercise discre-
tionary powers with respect to sale of trust res. And, 
moreover, the note sued upon which resulted in judgment 
and attachment was signed jointly by the testatrix, Mrs·. 
Bush, and beneficiary George Bush. Hence, the judment 
holder was a credior of textatrix's estate. It will thus 
appear that these Pennsylvania cases are clearly disting-
uisable on the facts from the case at bar. And naturally 
the decision of the court is affected by the particular facts 
invplved in the case. 
ILLINOIS CASES 
On page 8 of respondent's brief, counsel cite the Ill-
inois case of O'Hare vs. Jo~ston, 113 N.E. 127, and a 
federal case, Commissioner f!i Internal Revenue vs. Blair, 
60 Fed. ( 2d) 340, and contends that these cases have 
shown a tendencv of the Illinois courts, to restrict the rule 
" 
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laid down in the earlier Illinois cases cited by appellants,. 
viz., Bennett vs. Bennett, 75 N.E. 339; Wagner vs. Wagner 
91 N.E. 66; and Wallace vs. Foxwell, 95 N.E. 985. 
It will be seen however, that when the cases cited by 
counsel are carefully examined, they neither overrule nor 
restrict the rule laid down in the Bennett, Wagner, and 
Wallace cases. In fact, O'Hare vs. Johnston, supra, is 
authority Jor appellant, and although the court stated 
that there was no evidence to show that Johnston's chil-
dren were spendthrifts, nevertheless, Johnston's will di-
rects that certain of his property be placed with the Union 
Trust Company, in trust, for a period of 30 years after his. 
death, that the trust company shall invest the funds and 
said trust company shall pay one-half of the net income 
arising fron1 said trust fund, to his son William and one-
half to his daughter Hazel, and that said payments shall 
be made semi-annually. At the expiration of said period 
of 30 years, to pay to his said son and daughter, each 
certain property (describing it) and that in the event of 
the death of either William or Hazel after the testator's 
death and before the expiration of said trust period·, that 
their respective shares shall then be paid to the child. or 
children of said son or daughter. 
It will thus be seen that the Johnston will is identical 
with the Cronquist will. 'The Illinois Court drew the fol-
lowing conclusion which is applicable to the ·Cronquist 
trust: 
"We think the conclusion might well be drawn 
that the reason for creating this trust was based on 
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I 
the desire of the testator to keep his property in his 
O\Vll decedants and prevent it from going, in the next 
generation, to strangers to his blood. This trust was 
certainly an appropriate method for bringing about 
this result. But we are of the opinon that it is un-
necessary to decide \vhether or not the tn1st created 
by clause 4 is classified as a spendthrift trust, so far 
as concerns the determination whether the trust estate 
"·as Yested or contingent.'' 
The following deductions made by the Illinois Court 
applies to the case at bar: 
t:t:~lanifestly, the testator intended to provide for 
every contingency which he thought might arise in 
regard to the death of one or both of his children, 
either before or after his death, with or without issue, 
and to make gifts over in anticipatio·n of such con-
tingencies. (Italics supplied). 
And the following conclusion applies to the case at 
b~: ' 
t:t:W e have reached the conclusion that the will 
provided that the gifts to the grandchildren should 
vest in them at the death of their parents. This con-
struction is plainly warranted by the language of the 
will and gives effect and carries into execution the 
testatol s intention.'' (Italics supplied). 
In the Blair case supra, the Federal Circuit Court. of 
Appeals, decided a case where the facts were very similar 
to the facts in the case at bar. The court reviewed the 
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Illinois cases and it definitely appears that the federal 
court followed the rule laid down in the Bennett, Wallace 
& Wagner cases. The court also held that the will under 
consideration created a spendthrift trust and that the 
beneficiary could not assign his interest to the income 
until after the actual receipt thereof. In the closing por-
tion of the opinion, the court said; 
"It is quite obvious to us, under the Illinois de-
cisions to which we have referred, that the trust 
created by the will in the instant case is a spendthrift 
trust, and that respondent had no right to alienate it.',. 
CALIFORNIA CASES 
On pages 13-15, of respondent's brief, counsel have 
referred to· and discussed the following California cases 
cited in appellants brief, viz., Seymour vs. McAvoy, 53 
Pac. 946; In Re: Blakes Estate, 108 Pac. 287; Fletcher vs. 
Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 187 Pac. 425; and In 
Re: De .Lano's Estate, 145 P. 2d. 672. It is respectfully 
submitted that the foregoing California cases support the 
appellants contention that the Cronquist will creates a 
spendthrift trust and the courts attention is particularly 
invited to a ·review of these cases on pages 11-14 of ap-
pellant's brief. 
Defandant cites the case of Kelley vs. Kelly, (Cal.), 
79 Pac. 2d 1060, as authority for its contention that the 
Cronquist will does not create a spendthrift trust. How-
ever, when the Kelly case is carefully read and analyzed, 
it will be seen that Kelly, a stepson of the testator, took a 
vested remainder in one-half of the property that had 
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previously been placed in trust for the life of his mother. 
l'hat case would be analogous to the Cronquist case had 
Olif Cronquisfs \Yife survived him, and had he placed in 
tntst the property in question for her life with the remain-
der over to his three children. Then had Heber during 
the life of his rnother, made an assignment of an expected 
interest in his property, he would have made the assign-
ment as a devisee of Olif Cronquist, but as having a vested 
interest subject only to the life tin1e of his mother, and 
not as a beneficiarv tmder a trust which came into effect 
after his father:J s death. 
The facts in that case will also disclose that Kelley 
had a vested interest in said property upon the death of 
his mother, and something which he could, therefore, 
definitely assign or agree to assign. Then too, it must be 
remembered that enforcement of his contract could in no 
way interefere with the enjoyment by his mother of the 
terms of the trust. And ~e terms of the trust were fully 
complied with and its objects attained upon her death and 
thereafter there was nothing left to do except to distri-
bute Kelley:Js portion of the residue of the property to him. 
However, in the Cronquist trust, ther·e was no cer-
tainty that Heber would ever succeed to any property. 
And moreover, by the terms of the trust, Olif Cronquist 
provided that in any event Heber shall succeed to no pro-
perty until after the end of twenty years, thus providing 
in the meantime that he could not in any way dissipate 
or alienate the trust property. Olif even went so far as to 
provide against Heber's improvidence by vesting the legal 
title in the property in the Cache Valley Bank, as trustee. 
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If effect is now given to respondent's contention, then the 
intent of Olif Cronquist to provide against Heber's im-
providence will be completely destroyed, and we submit 
that if Heber could destroy the effect of his father's will 
on the date of the purported agreement, then it follows 
that he could have likewise destroyed the effect of said 
will the day after the trust went into operation. 
It is significant that the California case of In Re: 
De Lana's estate 145 P. 2d 672, was decided by the appel-
late Court of California, subsequent to the decision of Kel-
ly vs. Kelly, supra, and it will be seen that the California 
court in the De Lano estate decision definitely approves 
of and follows the earlier decisions in California, Illinois, 
and Kansas, herein cit~d and also cited in appellants 
brief. But, the Kelly case was not even cited or referred 
to in R~: De Lana's estate. Therefore, counsel and the 
court in the J?e Lano estate case, supra, must not have con-
sidered the Kelly case as autho~ity. The following rules, 
which we~e contended for by appellant as determinative 
of the Cronquist will, are laid down by the California 
court in the DeLano case, supra,_ in the following language 
and citing cases: 
~'It is sufficient if the intent is reasonably plain 
upon a consideration of the will as a whole. Seymour 
v. McAvoy, 1898, 121 Cal. 438, 442, 53 P. 946, 41 
L.R.A. 544; SanDiego Trust, etc., Bank v. Heustis, 
supra, 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P. 2d 158; Jones v. Har-
rison, 8 Cir., 1925, 7 F. 2d 461. It is not necessary 
· that the instrument creating the trust contain all of 
the restrictions and qualifications incident to spend-
thrift trusts. 1 Underhill on Wills, p. 695, sec. 529; 
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3 Page on 'Vilis, p. 829, sec. 1308; Wagner v. Wagner, 
1910, :2-l-1 Ill. 101, 91 N.E. 66, 70, 18 Ann. Cas. 490; 
Bennett \·. Bennett, 1905, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N .E. 339, 
S-11. 4 L.R.A., N.S., 470; Wallace v. Foxwell, 1911, 
250 Ill. 616, 9t) N.E. 985, 50 L.R.A., N.S., 632; and 
cases listed in Sherman v. Havens, 94 Kan. 654, 146 
P. 1030, ~\nn. Cas. 1917B, page 400. The courts will 
not inquire "·hether the restrictions upon the use of 
the tn1st property were necessary for the protection 
of the beneficiary. \Vaguer v. Wagner, supra." 
On page 19 of respondent's brief, an attempt is made 
to distinguish the case of Everett vs. Haskins ( Kan.) 171 
Pac. 632, from the case at bar. and counsel say without 
any justification therefor, that, - ""the trend of the Kansas 
Court is in the same direction as the courts of Pennsyl-
vania, Illinois, and California." There is nothing in the 
case~·fittl- by respondent to justify the conclusion that 
any Q:eftt exists. The following excerpt from Evertt vs. 
Haskins, supra, will refute any S1.1ch conclusion: 
""The trustee's control, discretion, and power of 
disposition cannot be regulated or directed at the suit 
of creditors. The exercise of such authority by the 
courts would be in contravention of the terms of the 
will. __ Why did the testator put these provisions in 
his will? The answer is that he intended that William 
Henry Haskins should not exercise any discretion con-. 
cerning, or any control or power of disposition over, 
the property that was placed in the hands of the 
tn1stee." (Italics supplied.) 
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And a very recent Kansas case, In Re; Watts, 162 P. 
( 2d) 82, although the trustee was given power to decide 
when he should terminate the trust, yet it was held that 
the trustee's judgment must be upheld by the court when 
the facts justified it. This indicates how far the courts 
will go to uphold the solemnity of a trust. 
COLORADO CASES 
Counsel cite the Colorado case of Newell vs. Tubbs., 
84 P. ( 2d) 820, on page 23 of their brief. The language 
creating the trust in that case had the ear marks of a vested 
remainder, because it did not contain a limitation over to 
the heirs at law of the beneficiaries named in the trust. 
However, the Court did recognize the rule that if the will 
had created a spendthrift trust, Newell's assignment would 
have been invalid. The court said: 
·"The only question presented is whether that 
paragraph creates such a trust. If it does, N ewelt s 
assignment of his interest is invalid and such a hold-
ing necessarily would result in a reversal of the jud-
ment.~~ (Italics supplied). 
It is interesting to contrast the case of Newell vs. 
Tubbs, supra, with an earlier Colorado case of Snyder 
vs. O'Conner, 81 P. ( 2d) 773, where the trust provision of 
the will was very similar to that in the Cronquist will as 
will be seen by the following language of the Court: 
"By his will the testator provided among other 
things that all but $1,000 of the residue of his pro-
perty should be held in trust by his executors in 
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"Fund B'' and that the incon1e therefrom should be 
paid sen1i-annually to his five children, Morris, Max, 
Irving, Rose and Annie, equally. In case any of the 
five children die, that child:os share of the income was 
to be paid to his or her issue equally, and if no issue 
surrired the share tvas to be added to the shares of 
the Stl'rricing children.'~ (Italics supplied.) 
.. -\.nd although the will did expressly provide against 
anticipation and alienation, yet the court predicated its 
decision largely upon the fact that J\1ax Snyder, one of 
the beneficiaries, held only a contingent remainder, and 
that in case of his death before the trust period of 10 
years expired, his share would go to his issue if he left 
issue, otherwise his share would be added to the shares of 
the surviving children. In other words, he held only a 
contingent remaitlder. And in reaching the conclusion that 
the assignment was void, the court said: 
c:c:Until the county court orders the trust fund dis-
tributed, the property is in a real sense in custodia 
legis. Moreover, it is wholly uncertain whether in 
1942 Max Snyder will be among the then surviving 
beneficiaries who are to share in the corpus of the 
trust. We cannot allow the district court to create, 
by a sort of judicial prophecy, what amounts to an 
anticipated lien that may never exist." (Italics sup-
plied). 
ARKANSAS CASES 
POOL vs. CROSS COUNTRY BANK, 133 S.W. (2d) 19 
The above case is distinguishable from the case at 
bar. It appears ftom the facts that the beneficiary had a 
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vested remainder and also had a quitclaim deed from the 
remaining beneficiaries who also held vested remainders. 
Then too, it appears that the trustees, the brothers of the 
testatrix, could exercise their discretion in determining 
how long to continue the trust. The court observed: 
"We get the impression, and are of the opinion 
that while the testatrix sought to protect her son from 
his improvidence and from misfortune, and to that 
end, created what would otherwise be a spendthrift 
trust, yet it was to be such only so long as the trustees, 
her brothers, should in their discretion, continue it 
h " as sue . 
MILLER vs. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
180 S. W. 581. 
. . 
We agree with the quotation from the above case 
appearing at top of page 25 of respondent's brief. The last 
clause says: 
"or a clear and undoubted intention is expressed in 
in the will." 
It is our contention that this clause applies to the 
Cronquist will. 
NUN vs. FITCHE-GOETTENGER, 245 S.W. 421. 
It will be seen that the above case recognizes the 
doctrine that, -
"It is not necessary however, that the instrument 
creating a spendthrift trust should contain an express 
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15 
declaration that the interest of the beneficiary shall 
not be transferred, assigned, or subjected to the pay-
'lnent of his debts provided such appears to be· the 
ciear intention of the donor 01' testator, as gathered, 
fronl all the parts of the instrument construed to-
gether in the light of attending circumstances. ~ ~ ~ 
The trust created by the will under consideration is 
of this clnss.'' . (Italics supplied). 
The foregoing n1le is certainly authority for appel-
lanfs contention that the Cronquist will creates a spend-
thrift tn1st. 
~1ARYLAND CASE 
The case of Baker vs. Keiser, 75 Md. 332, 23 Alt. 735, 
is cited by respondents on p~ge 25 of their brief. An 
examination of this case discloses that Louis Keiser left 
certain property in trust for and during the life of his 
six children, giving each child a one-sixth share of the 
income from the trust during their life and after their 
death a one-sixth of the tn1st property was to be equally 
divided between the children of each child. Levina Cra-
mer, one of his married daughters and husband were 
indebted upon a promissory note which was reduced to 
judgment in the sum of $395.98, and an attachment was 
levied against her income in the sum of $205.52 then ac-
cnled and, in the possession of the trustee. The trust 
property was not attached but merely the accrued income. 
The court held in effect that since the income had already 
accrued and was in the possession of the t!ustee, that it 
was subject to attachment by ~ creditor. It will therefore 
be seen that the Keiser case is distinguishable from the 
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case at bar because in that case the trust estate was not 
involved and in the case at bar the income is not involved. 
However, it may be strongly inferred from the decision 
in that case, that had the attachment been levied against 
the trust estate, the court would have held that the same 
was not ·subject to attachment by a creditor because of 
the fact that there was a limitation over to the children 
of Levina Cramer, and therefore it constituted a spend-
thrift trust. 
From an analysis of the above ceses, it will be seen 
that they may be grouped in the following classes: Three 
of them relate to discretionary trusts; and in two of them 
the benficiary had a vested remainder, and in one of them 
the income had accrued and was in the possession of the 
trustee, and for that reason the court held the income 
could be attached, so that these cases are distinguisable 
from the facts in the case at bar. But in the remaining 
six cases, where the facts are sin1ilar to the case bar, the 
courts held that spendthrift trusts were created, hence 
the latter cases are authority for appellants. 
III 
Counsel for respondents attempt to leave the im-
pression that appellants' position is inequitable because 
of the purported agreement entered into. -It is apparent 
that any such contention must fail because appellants have 
offered to make an accounting of the $4,000.00 paid. Fur-
thermore, any such contention simply confuses or attempts 
to bury the real issue in this case which is, - giving effect 
to the plain language contained in the will of Olif Cron-
quist. 
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The courts invariably follow the rule of law as given 
by Scott on ,Trust Vol. 1, Sec. 152.3, wherein he says: 
"Even if the assignee pays value for the assign-
ment, the assignn1ent is ineffective as a transfer of 
the beneficial interest, and the beneficiary can at any 
tirne revoke it. It seen1s clear, however, that if the 
beneficiary revokes the assignment, the assignee is 
entitled to recover the amout which he paid for the 
assignment on the ground that there is a failure of 
consideration. He thereby becomes a creditor of the 
beneficia-ry fo·r the amout so paid, and he can main-
tain an action against the beneficiary for the amount 
so paid, and can reach and apply to the satisfaction of 
his claim any property of the beneficiary which is 
not exempt from the claims of creditors. 64 L.R.A. 
1917 .A. 988." (Italics supplied). 
IV 
On page 13 of respondent's brief, counsel says: 
"Would it not be Wisdom, in interpreting the intention of 
testator, Olif Cronquist, to adopt a rule of construction 
that withstands the test of time,'' and again at page 20 'in 
raised type; "We vigorously contend, however, that there 
is nothing in the Cronquist will from which it may be 
even inferred that the testator intended to limit the power 
of his beneficiaries to agree to convey their interest in the 
trust estate." It is convenient here to discuss both state-
ments together. The first statement sounds "lofty" and 
does call for a desirable end, but attempts to reach this 
desirable end by "interpreting the intention of testator" 
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by ignoring testator~s plain words. He, testator, in his will 
by. ~anguage too plain for doubt, stated the object and 
purpose he desired to attain. 
It certainly is the duty of the courts to determine tes-
tator's intention and sustain it if legally possible. In fact, 
such is the pla~n provisions of Chapter 2, Title 101, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, and the decisions of this court. The 
second statement above, if followed, would lay down a 
rule of law revolutionary to the decisions of this court 
hereinafter referred to. It suggests· that an inference not 
contained in the will should overcome the plain language 
of the will. In fact, this is the effect of all of counsel's 
statements in their brief as to "public policy," and in this 
connection it is believed a full and complete answer to all 
of counsel's comments about "public policy" is that the 
majority of the courts are against respondenf s contention 
and they hold that effect be given to wills according to 
testator's intention. 
A review of the following Utah cases will be helpful 
and beginning with the early case of In Re Campbell's 
Estate, 27 Ut8ll 365, 75 Pac. 851, this court quoted with 
approval the following r1:1le announced by Chief Justice 
Shaw in the case of Quincey vs. Rogers, 9 Cush. 291: 
"The intent of the testator is the polar star which 
shall guide the court in its decision." 
In a later Utah case of In Re Poppleton's Estate, 34 
Utah 285, 97 Pac. 138, ·this. court in interpreting Sectio~ 
2767, Comp. Laws of --1907, now Section 101-2-1 U.C.A. 
1943, quotes the ffrst sentence from that section which 
reads. as follows: 
.. 
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··.A. ''rill is to be construed according to the in-
tention of the testator.'' 
A.gain the Court said: 
"This intention is to be ascertained from the 
language used by the testator in the will. If' the mean-
ing is clear from the words used, a· resort to rules of 
construction is neither necessary nor permissable. <~: <~: <~: 
Our duty, therefore, is to ascertain this intention." 
The following quotation from that case is also perti-
nent to the case at bar: 
"The testator, ho\vever, was disposing of his own pro-
pe·rty, and he could i1npose any lawful condition upon 
any bequest that to him seemed proper. (Italics sup-
plied). 
The next case is In Re Dewev's Estate, 45 Utah 98, 
~ 
143 Pac. 124, where this Court laid down the following 
rule of construction with respect to the intention of the 
testator: 
''It is the cardinal principle or canon of construc-
tion that the intention of the testator must prevail if 
such intention, when ascertained, is not contrary to 
the law and the testator has complied with the forms 
of law in the execution of his will." 
This Court also laid down the well known rule with 
respect to the creation of a tn1st in the following language: 
"One rule, which we think may be said to be of 
universal application, is to the effect that no particu-
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lar words are necessary to create a trust, and that if 
fronl all the language used by the testator in his will 
a trust is fairly implied, the courts will enforce the 
same." (Italics supplied). 
In that opinion the following rule was also approved 
from I Jarman on Wills (6th Ed. ) , page 355, where it is 
said: 
"For technical language, of course, is not neces-
sary to create a trust. It is enough that the intention 
is apparent." 
In Re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 7 48, 
this Court said: · 
"A Will is to be construed according to the in-
tention of the testator." 
"In case of uncertainty arising upon the face of a 
will as to the application of any of its provisions, the 
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words 
of the will, taking in view the circumstances under 
which it was made exclusive of his oral declarations.'" 
And in that case, the Court reaffirmed the following 
rule in citing earlier Utah cases as follows: 
t:t:The intention of ·the testator t:is the ultimate 
object· to be kept in mind and to which all rules 
must yield."'' (In Re Poppleton's Estate, 34 Utah, 285, 
97 Pac. 138, 131 Am. St. Rep. 842) and c'is the polar 
star which should guide the court in its decision.'~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
-(In Re Can1pbell, 27 Utah, 361,75 Pac. 851; Rumel v. 
Solomon, 54 Utah, 25, 180 Pac. 419) ." (Italics sup-
plied). 
The follo,ving language is applicable to the case at 
bar: 
<'The foregoing principles of law are decisive of 
this case, and enable us to g·ive full effect to the mani-
fest intention of the testator." (Italics supplied).' 
It would seem that the above cases· fully answer the 
two statement~ quoted from the respondenfs brief and 
show conclusiveiy that they can have no application to 
the facts in the case at bar. \Ve also submit that no rule 
of public policy should cause this court in any- way to 
change the effect of its previous decisions which support 
the majority rule. 
In the case of Latimer vs. Holladay, (Utah) 134 Pac. 
(2d) 183, cited on page 32 of respondenfs brief, the. facts 
disclose that brother and sis~er (only h~irs of mother) en-
tered into a contract to buy one another out as an expect-
ant heir of their mother for a certain consideration. The 
mother had made a will in which she provided that one-
half of her property shall go to each child, and unknown 
to the daughter, thereaft~r the mother conveyed to the 
son. The 'son defended on the grounds of lack of con-
sideration. 
But the facts of the above case t#'so dissimilar to 
the facts in the Cronquist case, that it would certainly take 
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a strained analogy to make that case worth anything, 
when applied to the facts in the case at bar. The pro-
perty in that case was not impressed with a trust, and the 
contract was executed before the mother's death . 
It is furthermore submitted that the above fully an-
swers any difficulty which counsel imagines might con-
front a title exan1iner. Certainly no title examiner would 
encounter any difficulty in interpreting the meaning of 
the language employed in the Cronquist will. In fact, res-
pondent had no difficulty in understanding the trust pro-
visions of the will, because in its purported contract, a 
provision was made requiring Heber and Idella Cronquist 
to execute and deliver to respondent a warranty deed after 
the termination of the trust. And of course, in accordance 
with the recent decision of this court, fa quitclaim deed 
does not convey after acquired title. See Duncan vs. 
Remmel wright, et ux. (Utah) 186 P. ( 2d) 964. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Cronquist will 
created a spendthrift trust for the following among other 
reasons stated in appellant's brief. 
(a) The legal title was vested in the trustee for the 
full period of 20 years. " 
(b) That during the trust period Olif Cronquist's 
children held no vested interest in· the trust property. 
They held mer_ely a contingent interest. 
(c) That there was a limitation over to the heirs at 
law of each child. 
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(d) That vesting the legal title, as well as the man-
agenlent and control of said property in the trustee, evi-
denced a clear intent on the part of testator to create a 
spendthrift trust. 
The applellants respectfully submit to this Honorable 
Court that the findings, conclusion and judgment of tbe 
trial court be reversed, remanding the case and directing 
that ~e trial court ente~ f~~~~f'l~c~ion, and ju~g­
ment m f;~ the plamtiffsaf!S p ye m the complamt, 
and that · be awarded costs expended in the trial 
court and on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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